RFC 4033

DNS Security Introduction and Requirements
Standards Track Obsoletes: RFC 2535
March 2005
Abstract: DNSSEC provides origin authentication and data integrity for DNS responses using digital signatures. DNSSEC protects against DNS spoofing and cache poisoning attacks that could redirect 3GPP signaling to malicious endpoints.
Canonical source: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4033  |  IETF Datatracker

1. Introduction

▶

DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, allowing resolvers to verify that DNS responses are authentic and unmodified. Without DNSSEC, DNS responses can be spoofed, redirecting traffic to attacker-controlled servers.

For 3GPP networks, DNS spoofing is a critical threat — compromised DNS could redirect Diameter signaling, IMS registration, or SBI discovery to malicious NFs. DNSSEC provides the foundation for trusted DNS resolution.

2. DNSSEC Resource Records

▶
Record Type Description Purpose
RRSIG Resource Record Signature Digital signature over an RRset
DNSKEY DNS Public Key Zone signing key and key signing key
DS Delegation Signer Hash of child zone's DNSKEY — chain of trust
NSEC/NSEC3 Next Secure Authenticated denial of existence

3. Chain of Trust

▶

The chain of trust starts from a configured trust anchor (root zone DNSKEY) and follows DS records down through the DNS hierarchy to the target zone's signed records.

  Root (.)          → DNSKEY (root KSK/ZSK)
|                    ↓ signs
|               RRSIG for DS of .org
|
.org              → DNSKEY (org KSK/ZSK)
|                    ↓ signs
|               RRSIG for DS of 3gppnetwork.org
|
3gppnetwork.org   → DNSKEY (zone KSK/ZSK)
|                    ↓ signs
|               RRSIG for A/AAAA/SRV records
|
epc.mnc001.mcc208.3gppnetwork.org
→ SRV + RRSIG (verified!)

4. DNSSEC Validation Process

▶
  • Resolver requests DNS records with the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit set in EDNS0
  • Authoritative server returns records with RRSIG signatures
  • Resolver retrieves DNSKEY for the zone and verifies RRSIG
  • DS record in parent zone authenticates the DNSKEY
  • Chain continues up to the trust anchor (root)
  • If any signature is invalid → SERVFAIL (validation failure)

5. Security Considerations

▶
  • DNSSEC provides authentication and integrity but NOT confidentiality — queries/responses are still visible
  • DNSSEC amplification attacks can be used for DDoS — response sizes increase significantly
  • Key management (key rollover) must be handled carefully to avoid validation failures
  • NSEC can leak zone contents (zone enumeration) — NSEC3 provides hashed denial of existence