RFC 4033
1. Introduction
▶DNSSEC adds cryptographic signatures to DNS records, allowing resolvers to verify that DNS responses are authentic and unmodified. Without DNSSEC, DNS responses can be spoofed, redirecting traffic to attacker-controlled servers.
For 3GPP networks, DNS spoofing is a critical threat — compromised DNS could redirect Diameter signaling, IMS registration, or SBI discovery to malicious NFs. DNSSEC provides the foundation for trusted DNS resolution.
2. DNSSEC Resource Records
▶| Record Type | Description | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| RRSIG | Resource Record Signature | Digital signature over an RRset |
| DNSKEY | DNS Public Key | Zone signing key and key signing key |
| DS | Delegation Signer | Hash of child zone's DNSKEY — chain of trust |
| NSEC/NSEC3 | Next Secure | Authenticated denial of existence |
3. Chain of Trust
▶The chain of trust starts from a configured trust anchor (root zone DNSKEY) and follows DS records down through the DNS hierarchy to the target zone's signed records.
Root (.) → DNSKEY (root KSK/ZSK) | ↓ signs | RRSIG for DS of .org | .org → DNSKEY (org KSK/ZSK) | ↓ signs | RRSIG for DS of 3gppnetwork.org | 3gppnetwork.org → DNSKEY (zone KSK/ZSK) | ↓ signs | RRSIG for A/AAAA/SRV records | epc.mnc001.mcc208.3gppnetwork.org → SRV + RRSIG (verified!)
4. DNSSEC Validation Process
▶- Resolver requests DNS records with the DO (DNSSEC OK) bit set in EDNS0
- Authoritative server returns records with RRSIG signatures
- Resolver retrieves DNSKEY for the zone and verifies RRSIG
- DS record in parent zone authenticates the DNSKEY
- Chain continues up to the trust anchor (root)
- If any signature is invalid → SERVFAIL (validation failure)
5. Security Considerations
▶- DNSSEC provides authentication and integrity but NOT confidentiality — queries/responses are still visible
- DNSSEC amplification attacks can be used for DDoS — response sizes increase significantly
- Key management (key rollover) must be handled carefully to avoid validation failures
- NSEC can leak zone contents (zone enumeration) — NSEC3 provides hashed denial of existence