RFC 4302

IP Authentication Header
Standards Track Obsoletes: RFC 2402
December 2005
Abstract: This document describes the IP Authentication Header (AH), which provides connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, and optional anti-replay protection for IP datagrams. AH does NOT provide confidentiality (encryption).
Canonical source: https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4302  |  IETF Datatracker

1. Introduction

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AH provides data integrity and authentication for the entire IP packet including the header (unlike ESP which only protects the payload). However, AH does NOT provide encryption.

AH is defined for completeness in the IPsec architecture but is NOT used in 3GPP NDS/IP. TS 33.210 exclusively uses ESP (RFC 4303) for both confidentiality and integrity.

3GPP Note: AH is NOT used in 3GPP NDS/IP implementations. ESP with authentication provides equivalent integrity plus confidentiality. This RFC is referenced for IPsec architecture completeness.

2. AH Header Format

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AH is IP protocol number 51. The ICV covers the entire IP packet with mutable fields (TTL, header checksum) set to zero before computation.

  0                   1                   2                   3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|  Next Header  |  Payload Len  |           RESERVED          |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                 Security Parameters Index (SPI)             |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                    Sequence Number Field                    |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
|                                                             |
+                Integrity Check Value (ICV)                  +
|                         (variable)                          |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+

3. AH vs ESP Comparison

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Feature AH (RFC 4302) ESP (RFC 4303)
Confidentiality No Yes
Payload authentication Yes Yes
IP header authentication Yes (immutable fields) No (outer header)
Anti-replay Yes Yes
NAT traversal No (breaks checksum) Yes (UDP encapsulation)
3GPP NDS/IP usage NOT used MANDATORY

4. Security Considerations

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  • AH cannot traverse NAT devices because the authentication covers IP addresses which NAT modifies
  • AH provides no confidentiality — payload is transmitted in plaintext
  • ESP with authentication provides superset functionality and is universally preferred
  • AH remains in specifications for backward compatibility and niche use cases requiring IP header integrity