RFC 5425 — TLS Transport for Syslog
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Mapping for Syslog — secure, reliable delivery of syslog messages over TLS, providing encryption, authentication, and integrity for audit log transport.
1. Introduction
▶RFC 5425 defines the use of TLS to provide a secure, connection-oriented transport for syslog messages. This addresses the critical ISO 27001 requirement that security logs must be protected against tampering and unauthorized access during transport.
2. Transport Architecture
▶Syslog Sender TLS Channel (port 6514) Syslog Collector ┌──────────┐ ┌─────────────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ │ App Logs │──MSG──>│ TLS 1.2+ │──MSG──>│ SIEM/Log │ │ Auth Logs│ │ Mutual Auth (opt) │ │ Aggregator │ │ Sys Logs │ │ AES-256-GCM │ │ Analysis │ └──────────┘ └─────────────────────┘ └──────────────┘
3. TLS Requirements
▶- TLS version: MUST support TLS 1.2+ (SHOULD use TLS 1.3 per RFC 9325)
- Server authentication: Syslog collector MUST present a valid certificate
- Client authentication: Mutual TLS RECOMMENDED for sender identity verification
- Certificate validation: Full chain validation per RFC 5280
- Session resumption: Supported for performance with persistent connections
4. Message Framing
▶TLS transport uses octet-counting framing to delineate syslog messages within the TLS stream:
MSG-LEN SP SYSLOG-MSG MSG-LEN SP SYSLOG-MSG ... Example: 195 <34>1 2026-03-29T17:30:00Z host app 1234 AUTH [...] msg
This avoids the delimiter-based framing issues of traditional UDP syslog.
5. Security Considerations
▶- Certificate management: Automate certificate rotation per A.8.24 — consider ACME (RFC 8555)
- Connection persistence: Maintain persistent TLS connections to avoid handshake overhead and log gaps
- Failover: Configure secondary collectors for high availability of audit logs
- Cipher suites: Use AEAD cipher suites (AES-GCM) — disable CBC mode